The Eleventh Day: The Full Story Of 9 Eleven And Osama Bin Laden

by deepika

From now on, we are going to protect our national pursuits, regardless of the place America’s interests lie within the region.” There was extra, much more, and it rocked the Bush administration. The President responded with a placatory letter that appeared to go far towards the Saudi position of endorsing the creation of a viable Palestinian state. As of September 7, it looked as if the state of affairs had stabilized. Simply put, the spies and the special brokers are not adequate, evil sufficient, or gutsy sufficient.… That conclusion is predicated partly on, dare I say it, widespread sense, but also on years spent overlaying national safety matters.… Such a plot … would require dozens of individuals to try such a scheme.

They “live and work and performance and are fostered and nanced and inspired, if not just tolerated, by a series of nations.… I know so much, and what I even have said, as clearly as I know how, is that states are supporting these individuals.” Pressed to elaborate, Rumsfeld was silent for a long moment. Then, saying it was “a delicate matter,” he modified the topic. Three years later, the 9-11 Commission would consider whether or not any of three overseas international locations specifically may need had a role in 9/11. Two had been self-avowed foes of the United States—Iran and Iraq.

When the know-how became out there, his operatives would use the Internet as an everyday device. Omar observed that his father now spent a lot time recording his thoughts on a dictating machine. The fruit of his newest considering came in August 1996, with a fax transmission to the o ce of al-Quds al-Arabi— o r The Arab Jerusalem—an Arabic-language newspaper printed in London. It was a twelve-thousand-word message from the mountain, in bin Laden’s words from “the summit of the Hindu Kush,” one which at the time received little coverage within the West.

Corn’s piece attracted a howl of rage on the Internet from the busy scribblers he had characterized as “silly.” Eight years of scribbling and talk show jawing later, although, their theories nonetheless look silly. THERE IS NO REASON to doubt that a group of terrorists targeted 4 airliners on September eleven. There isn’t any good cause to suspect that the collapse of the Twin Towers and nearby buildings, and the ensuing deaths, were brought on by anything aside from the inferno started by the planes’ influence. There isn’t any cause, either, to suspect that the harm and death at the Pentagon was attributable to anything aside from the plane putting the constructing. The would-be “tourist,” twenty- ve-year-old Mohamed elKahtani, mentioned that, although he would be staying just a few days, he didn’t know the place he would be going subsequent. He rst stated that somebody because of arrive from abroad can be paying for his onward travel, then that another “someone” was ready for him in Arrivals.

The crash on the Pentagon has additionally preoccupied the skeptics, although, and appearances suggest they are in spectacular firm. Strange,” appeared “nervous, paranoid, and anxious.” In the weeks earlier than the strikes, Atta had his males engaged on their private documentation. Some of the terrorists had solely passports, and young males with Arab passports might have prompted closer scrutiny at airport safety. With the assistance of individuals prepared to vouch for them—in return for a bribe— a number of now obtained state IDs. Even earlier than Atta handed the date of the planned strikes up the road, the terrorists had already begun making airline reservations and purchasing tickets for September 11.

I have nobody to speak to … and I notice I’m the commander-in-chief and the country has simply come beneath attack.” Once out of the classroom, Bush joined aides watching the TV information, saw the Trade Center burning, and talked on the phone with Cheney and Rice. He decided to make a short statement, then y again to Washington. Unknown to the President, although, as he mulled what to tell the national audience, disaster was spiraling into calamity. In 2000, when Hanjour turned up in one of the Afghan camps and let it be identified that he was a quali ed pilot, bin Laden’s aide Atef sent him to KSM. KSM noticed his potential, gave him a fundamental brie ng on the way to act within the eld, and dispatched him—equipped with a visa obtained in Saudi Arabia—to be a part of Nawaf al-Hazmi in San Diego.

KSM was to admit underneath interrogation that the suspect had indeed been sent to the States to join the terrorist staff —to “round out the number of hijackers.” It is rational to think that, but for the inspector’s acumen, there would have been ve somewhat than 4 hijackers aboard United Flight ninety three. With Kahtani’s additional muscle—Meléndez-Pérez remembered him as having seemed trim, “like a soldier”—they might have been better in a position to withstand the passengers’ attempt to retake the cockpit. Instead of plunging to the ground in Pennsylvania, Flight ninety three may need stayed on target and struck its goal in Washington. There had indeed been a “someone” waiting to fulfill Kahtani at Orlando.

’ The fact is, they did know.… FAA very intentionally orchestrated a harmful facade of security.… They knew how weak aviation safety was. They knew the terrorist risk was rising, however gambled nothing would occur if we stored the vulnerability secret and didn’t disrupt the airline industry. Our nation misplaced that wager.” In the spring and summer time of 2001, half of the FAA’s day by day summaries had mentioned music canada nonpremiumwelch bin Laden or al Qaeda. In July, it had “encouraged” all airlines to “exercise prudence and reveal a excessive degree of alertness.” There was little or no actual drive to ensure that higher security was enforced, nevertheless, no sense of urgency at the stage that mattered. “The terrorists do not operate in a vacuum,” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had advised reporters the week after September 11.

“Someday,” he wrote in an e-mail, “someone will die … the public is not going to understand why we were not more e ective and throwing every useful resource we had at certain ‘problems.’ ” The job of nding Mihdhar, nonetheless, went to an intelligence agent, Robert Fuller, working on his own. Corsi marked the project “Routine” because—she would later tell investigators— she “assigned no specific urgency to the matter.” The designation “Routine” gave Fuller thirty days to get underneath way. LIKE PRESIDENT BUSH, CIA director Tenet had spent part of August on vacation—again just like the President, shing. By his personal account, nonetheless, he kept very a lot abreast of developments. That month, he wrote in 2007, he had directed his counterterrorism unit to review old files—and thus took a part of the credit for the “discovery” that Mihdhar and Hazmi might be within the United States. To be no reality to allegations made after 9/11 that several of the terrorists, including Atta, drank alcohol to excess.

You may also like